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Decisions taken in our everyday lives are based on a wide variety of information so it is generally
very difficult to assess what are the strategies that guide us. Stock market therefore provides a
rich environment to study how people take decision since responding to market uncertainty needs
a constant update of these strategies. For this purpose, we run a lab-in-the-field experiment where
volunteers are given a controlled set of financial information -based on real data from worldwide
financial indices- and they are required to guess whether the market price would go up or down in
each situation. From the data collected we explore basic statistical traits, behavioural biases and
emerging strategies. In particular, we detect unintended patterns of behavior through consistent
actions which can be interpreted as Market Imitation and Win-Stay Lose-Shift emerging strategies,
being Market Imitation the most dominant one. We also observe that these strategies are affected
by external factors: the expert advice, the lack of information or an information overload reinforce
the use of these intuitive strategies, while the probability to follow them significantly decreases when
subjects spends more time to take a decision. The cohort analysis shows that women and children
are more prone to use such strategies although their performance is not undermined. Our results
are of interest for better handling clients expectations of trading companies, avoiding behavioural
anomalies in financial analysts decisions and improving not only the design of markets but also
the trading digital interfaces where information is set down. Strategies and behavioural biases
observed can also be translated into new agent based modelling or stochastic price dynamics to
better understand financial bubbles or the effects of asymmetric risk perception to price drops.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a trader. You will be facing the follow-
ing dilemma everyday: Will the market go up or down?
This is the most fundamental question that any finan-
cial trader, analyst, advisor, and even non-professional
investor with some savings on a given stock is trying to
answer using information available from the past -or even
from the present-. The key point is to anticipate your
action at least one step ahead to what the market will
finally do and decide to buy or sell accordingly with the
hope of getting some profit from each trade.
Stock price movements are triggered by the matched
bids and offers listed in the order book [1]. Bachelier
already proposed in 1900 a pure random walk through
a binomial process in discrete-time form to describe the
resulting price dynamics [2]. The French mathematician
compared the trader as a gambler and admitted in this
way that the speculative markets are driven by an impor-
tant degree of uncertainty. Later on, rational theory and
efficient market hypothesis better formulated the link be-
tween trader’s expectations and the evolution of financial
prices with the so-called utility function [3, 4]. This ro-
bust theory could synthetically be formulated with the
following couple of assumptions: (1) information con-
tained in the past is instantly and fully reflected in the
current price, and (2) there is no “free-lunch” without
taking any risk which technically means that there is an
absence of arbitrage [1]. The notion of market efficiency
brings out a conclusion which appears to be counter-
intuitive for a layman: the more efficient the market,
the more random is the sequence of price changes, being
the most efficient market the one where price changes are
completely random and unpredictable [1, 5].
Some studies have found that at least the so-called
technical trading strategies are less successful than ran-
dom strategies [6] and that basic properties in the order
book dynamics can be explained by an agent based model
which sends to the market buying and selling orders in
a complete random way [7]. However, being humans, we
still expect to make the correct guess and at least have
a better performance than just throwing a coin and this
may lead to some behavioural biases [8]. Traders intend
to find trends in historical data or hints in any other kind
(endogenous and exogenous) of information to reach the
inefficiencies of the market which presumably are quickly
dissolved in the trading floor [5, 9].
One could keep an eye in some financial indexes such
as the Dow Jones or the Japanese Nikkei or one could
even consider the opinion of a guru. In each case and
even dynamically, a trader dives into the ocean of in-
formation available and finds out his own recipes and
strategies. Several studies have already detected traces of
different information explorations in the financial trading
activity [10–18]. Correlations have been found between
daily number of mentions of a company in the Financial
Times and the daily transaction of that company [10],
or have quantified possible warning signs of stock mar-
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
01
55
7v
1 
 [q
-fi
n.G
N]
  6
 A
pr
 20
16
2ket moves based on activity in Google [11, 12] or Ya-
hoo! [13, 18] query volumes, Wikipedia page views [14],
and Twitter volume feeds [15]. It is also true that the
full amount of information available is neatly impossible
to grasp and to analyze in the too limited period of time
between transactions. In this sense, it has also been said
in the context of human decision making that traders
act on the basis of what is been defined as bounded ra-
tionality [19, 20]. Other economists also introduced the
prospect theory [21, 22] as an alternative approach to the
utility function by considering psychological and framing
factors in decision making. Risk perception shifts [23]
and judgment under uncertainty biases [24] have been
observed in several experiments able to tune the deci-
sion frame by for instance changing the formulation of a
problem.
The speculative markets with their rules and mech-
anisms are indeed a perfect scenario for studying hu-
man decision-making mechanisms in an uncertain envi-
ronment. However, it is difficult, yet not impossible, to
monitor the behavior of expert traders [9, 25–28], and
also traders are a biased sample not representative of the
society as a whole. For this reason, we designed a con-
trolled experiment that simplistically emulates a trad-
ing screen with data from real financial markets, and we
asked a large group of volunteers to respond to the ques-
tion: Based on the information that you have on your
screen, do you think that the market will go up or down?
The experiment was repeated under three different con-
trol settings, and for each of them the volunteers were
asked to respond the same question in 25 consecutive
rounds. We tracked how many types of information a
participant consulted -and for how long- before each de-
cision was made to obtain quantitative measurements for
later analysis.
This type of experiment might be understood as a
simplified version of the learning-to-forecast laboratory
experiments with human subjects where aggregate price
fluctuations and individual forecasting behaviour is stud-
ied [29, 30]. This experimental setting also frames de-
cision making within the so-called Stimulus-Response-
Outcome (S-R-O) contingencies [31–33] and plays with
the intrinsic relations between belief and performance
[34, 35]. In each round, the participant firstly can explore
the quantitative information available (that is: historical
price in different ways that include moving averages at
three different time windows, other markets performance,
and expert’s advice). Secondly, the participant decides
whether the given market will go “up” or “down”, and
thirdly she receives feedback whether her guess was cor-
rect or wrong. Using real financial time series from sev-
eral well-known markets introduces uncertainty, which
forces a constant update in participants’ strategies due
to the extreme variability of the market. This kind of
situation where participants have to respond with their
guesses receives the name of unexpected uncertainty or
volatility [31–33].
Therefore, we present the results of an experiment with
a large heterogeneous group of volunteers aimed to obtain
general conclusions concerning human decision making.
In particular, the experiment was specifically designed to
address to the efficient market hypothesis and how indi-
viduals digest information available [28, 29]. Participants
were then solely asked for a binary decision (market “up”
or market “down”), which constitutes a simple binomial
process allowing us to draw conclusions by means of easy-
to-apply and quantify statistical tools.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The experiment was carried out inside the context of
DAU Festival, a board game fair held in Barcelona dur-
ing the weekend of 14th and 15th of December 2013.
The event was organized by the Institute of Culture of
the City Council and attracted 6,000 attendants from
Barcelona and its surroundings. The experiment is
framed inside the Pop-Up Experiment concept described
in [36]. Participants did not know in advance the de-
tails of the experiment and were asked to play with Mr.
Banks (for the participants the experiment was referred
as a game) via an interface specifically created and ac-
cessible through identical iPads only available in a con-
trolled area -a space with chairs isolated from the rest
of the festival-. At least three researchers simultaneously
supervised the experiment at all times, preventing any
interaction among the volunteers and avoiding that any-
body was repeating the experiment. In order to satisfy
privacy issues, all personal data about the participants
were anonymized and de-identified in agreement with the
Spanish Law for Personal Data Protection and the insti-
tutional review board and data protection commissioner
of the Universitat de Barcelona. An online informed con-
sent was given by participants for their clinical records
to be used in this study.
The data shown in the game was taken from real his-
torical records of different international markets. In par-
ticular, we collected 30 series of 25 consecutive days of
stock data picked from the period between 01/02/2006-
12/29/2009 of daily prices of: the Spanish IBEX, the
German DAX and the S&P500 from United States. The
30 series show different tendencies, specifically 10 with
a downwards trend (bearish market), 10 with upwards
trend (bullish market) and 10 with no specific trend at
all (flat market). Series were assigned randomly to each
participant at the beginning of each experiment. Volun-
teers were told that they were playing with real data but
there was no mention about which was the specific mar-
ket nor about which was the time period of the series to
play with.
The main setup of the experiment consisted of a screen
that showed the information about the market with two
3FIG. 1. Pictures taken during the experiment and a
snapshot of the user interface. (top) Couple of pictures
taken during the experiment. Participants played Mr. Banks
game in the experiment delimited area. The general screen
showed information about the game and rankings of the best
performances in order to capture the attention of attendants
in the DAU Festival 2013. (bottom) The screenshots shows
the home screen with the buttons to select up (green) and
down (red). Participants consulted the different types of in-
formation available by clicking the buttons placed below the
price chart. The top right corner displays the user alias and
the coins being cumulated during the different rounds. See SI
for more screenshots of the user interface.
buttons to select if the market would go up or down. As
shown in top Figure 1, the information available could
be easily consulted with 5 buttons that allowed easy
navigation across the different screens. The first screen
(which corresponds to the home screen) contained the
price evolution on a daily basis of the series that should
be predicted. The screen was not only plotting the se-
ries from the first round, but also the previous 30 days
from that round. This screen incorporated two extra
buttons that showed a 5-day moving average and/or the
30-day moving average. The second screen showed a
chart of the intraday price of the day before. The third
screen showed an expert that offered advice using the
sentence ‘Current volatility is high (low) and the price
will go “up” (“down”)’ . The expert advice on the price
change was correct 60% of the times but participants
were not aware of this. A fourth screen simplified mar-
ket evolution with just including arrows in green (“up”)
and red (“down”) from market data of the last 30 days.
Finally, a fifth screen included information of 9 other
indexes (S&P500, DJI, NASDAQ, FTSE, IBEX, CAC,
DAX, NIKKEI, HSI) from 3 different continents with ar-
rows in green (“up”) and red (“down”) of the last 3 days.
Red and green colors were chosen to be consistent with
classic colours palette of trading floors infographics (See
Supplementary Information, Figs SI.8-SI.12).
The volunteers were asked to guess the price change
using this interface 100 times, organized in 4 different
scenarios with 25 rounds each. Each guess had a limited
time of 30 seconds and, before making a decision, the
participant was able to consult the information available
according to the scenario constraints. Applying a gamifi-
cation approach, each participant started the game with
1,000 coins. If the participant made a correct guess, their
current number of virtual coins were incremented by 5%
while, if she got a wrong guess, she got a negative return
of the same size. This gamifcation approach help us en-
gage the participants into responding the 100 questions
of the experiment.
As in a typical experiment in the laboratory, several
parameters were tuned in order to know which is the set
of conditions of certain phenomena to be produced or
what and how it is dependent on. One could easily sus-
pect that time and information are crucial aspects within
the making-decision process. In this way, we designed 4
different scenarios in Mr. Banks that could be played by
every participant (they were invited to play all scenarios
but they could also play just 1 or 2 of them). Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the to groups in each
scenario once they registered in the experiment. (1) In
“Time is money” all information was available but 50%
of the participants had only 10 seconds to take their deci-
sion instead of 30. (2) In “Information is power”, 50% of
the participants had access to all the information avail-
able while the others could only consult the price chart
of the home screen (without any averages). (3) In “The
computer virus”, the available information was limited to
only one screen apart from the home screen. For one half
of the participants this extra information was randomly
chosen while for the other half it could be selected. (4) In
“The trend hunter” 50% of the participants had access to
all the information available and the rest could only see
the market directions screen with up and down arrows.
They were warned that there was a trend in the financial
data without specifying whether it was bearish, bullish or
a flat period. Since this fourth scenario was conceptu-
ally different from the others we decided to exclude its
corresponding data for the latter analysis.
The experiment was also reproduced under the name
of “Hack your Brain” during the course of annual event
“Collective Awareness Platforms for Sustainability and
Social Innovation” (CAPS2015, organized by an FP7 Eu-
ropean project) that took place in 7 and 8 July 2015 and
4was hosted in Brussels (Belgium) (See Supplementary In-
formation). A space of 20 square meters at the venue
entrance was prepared to carry out the experiment with
same protocols and identical interface.
Same experiment is freely accessible at www.mr-
banks.net (in Catalan, Spanish and English). We
will shortly update the website to explain the whole
project and provide visualization interfaces for all
the data gathered. Raw data is available at
https://github.com/opensystemsUB/MrBanks.
RESULTS
283 volunteers were recruited to participate in the ex-
periment in the DAU Festival of Barcelona. The partici-
pants took 18,436 valid decisions (89 times they ran out of
time) and made 44,703 clicks On the screen. The nature
of this Pop-Up Experiment allowed us to study a wider
variety of demographics [36]. Thus, from the 283 sub-
jects, 99 (35%) were females and 184 (65%) were males.
The number of participants by age was distributed as fol-
lows: 84 below 15 years old (y.o.), 36 between 16 and 25
y.o., 78 between 26 and 35 y.o., 51 between 36 and 45 y.o.,
25 between 46 and 55 y.o., and 9 participants beyond 55
y.o. Additionally they also self-reported about their level
of finished studies divided in six groups: None(7), Pri-
mary (53), Secondary (37), High School (34), University
(148) and Unavailable (4). Participants had no particu-
lar expertise in financial markets. We have performed a
cohort analysis carefully discussed in the Supplementary
Information and in most of the cases we can aggregate
the data gathered.
Time, information and expert advice
Time, information and expert advice are easy-to-
quantify magnitudes to characterize the actions of the
participants in our experiment. Time spent in each round
is distributed around durations much shorter than the 30
seconds available in the experiment. The fastest quartile
of the participant’s sample takes their own decision in
less than 1.614 seconds, half part of participants needs
at most 3.431 seconds while the third and slowest quar-
tile of the sample spends more than 6.075 seconds (see
top-left Figure 2). Moreover, such values become quite
stable after 5 rounds thus indicating a fast and robust
learning curve in contrast with immersive and more so-
phisticated experiences [35]. The average amount (pan-
els) of information being consulted is 2.083 ± 0.011 per
round. Besides, time spent linearly grows with an slope
of 1.96±0.12 seconds as a function of the number of pieces
of information being consulted (see top-right Figure 2).
The experiment was also designed to measure a well-
known behavioural bias in financial markets: the influ-
ence of the expert advice [8, 37–42]. One of the tabs of-
fered the possibility to consult an expert who was stating
whether market will go “up” or “down” in the following
step. We somewhat arbitrarily fixed that the expert was
telling the truth, and thus guessing right, only 60% of
the times. Participants thus trusted their opinion with
0.69± 0.03 of probability, which is significantly a higher
value (with a 99.87% level of confidence) than the expert
forecast reliability. This overreaction phenomena (that
can also be understood within the context of the so-called
law of small numbers [37]) reinforce the mechanisms on
how financial analyst’s advice is able to generate abnor-
mal price changes [40]. Similar phenomena is observed
in other situations such as the horse racetrack betting
tasks [41].
The gender cohort analysis in our experiment shows
that men consult significantly more information than
women (and consequently spend more time to take a de-
cision) while kids consume much less information than
adults (and therefore spend much less time to decide).
These findings complement recent results studying the
effects of endogenous hormones in trading behaviour [43]
and also applies in terms of the educational level of the
participants (the higher the level, the more time is spent
to take a decision) as there exists a correlation between
age and educational level. Table SI.4 of the Supplemen-
tary Information provides further details of the cohort
analysis.
Performance, optimistic bias and repetitiveness
Regarding how well participants can anticipate price
change, we obtain 9,879 correct guesses in front of 8,557
incorrect guesses, therefore volunteers had a global suc-
cess empirical probability of 0.536 ± 0.004. This result
is slightly above of 50% success ratio that one could ex-
pect for a fully random process. One could hypothetize
that this higher success ratio is achieved by consider-
ing all the information provided and using the available
time to think about it. However, bottom Figure 2 shows
that consulting more screens of information, or spending
more time looking at the information, do not improve
performance -as has also been observed in other con-
texts such as sports forecasting [42]-. Those participants
who played the scenarios where they had information re-
stricted or time shortened (see Materials and Methods)
do not show significant differences in their success ratios.
Moreover, the fact that success ratio differs in bullish
markets (0.550± 0.011), flat markets (0.533± 0.011) and
bearish markets (0.503±0.011), lead to think that partic-
ipants may have a sophisticated behavioural bias behind.
The cohort analysis does not show significant differences
of success in terms of gender and age although, as men-
tioned above, there are differences in terms of the time
spent to take a decision and the amount of information
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FIG. 2. Time, information and performance statistics. (top left) The time spent in each round by participants rapidly
decreases as can be seen with the evolution of the median (solid line) and quartiles (dashed). Shadows within the plot also show
the different quartile regions when all the 25 rounds are considered (Q1 = 1.614, Q2 = 3.431, Q3 = 6.075). (top right) Boxplot
of the time spent to take a decision as a function of the number of additional pieces information being consulted apart from the
price chart displayed at the home screen. Plot shows a linear growth with slope 1.96± 0.12 and origin ordinate 1.89. (bottom)
Success ratio of participants’ guesses does not improve when more information is being consulted. Error bars correspond to
the standard deviation of a binomial distribution.
being consulted.
Table I shows that the probability that participants
choose “up” (p(↑) = 0.606 ± 0.004) is not only very far
from a pure random value (0.5) but also significantly
higher than the empirical probability of the market to
go “up” (p(↑M ) = 0.533± 0.004). Such optimistic bias is
also well-known in behavioural finance literature [44] and
our experiment allows to make this effect neatly evident.
The bias is general among all cohorts studied; age, genre
and education level (see Table SI.1 of the Supplementary
Information).
It is also known that humans tend to repeat same de-
cision [8]. Table I shows that this tendency in our exper-
iment has a probability of 0.561±0.004. The value is sig-
nificantly higher than the 0.5 from a random behaviour.
One could argue that participants believe that market
has a trend so they act accordingly. However, such prob-
ability is significantly higher than the probability that
the market repeats the same outcome (0.536± 0.004) so
this behavioural traits can be interpreted as another bias
since it relies on a belief perseverance (also called con-
firmatory bias) [8]. The cohort analysis in Table SI.2
of the Supplementary Information only shows a single
exception: the well known fact that children are more
inconstant in their decisions [45].
Market Imitation and Win-Stay Lose-Shift emerging
strategies
Our minds have a tendency to introduce biases in pro-
cessing certain kinds of information. Furthermore, they
also create unintended patterns through consistent ac-
tions, that is: emerging strategies [33, 46]. The Market
Imitation (MI), also called automatic imitation by neu-
ropsicologists [47], is one possible emerging strategy. It
is based on an stimulus response which does not wait for
an outcome and just mimics the external input received.
In our case this means that the participant’s decision has
a strong influence of what market did in the previous
round. The MI strategy has been carefully studied for
instance in rock-paper-scissors game [48] and in genera-
tion of random sequence by individuals [49]. The S-R-
O design of our experiment [31] also allows us to study
whether the performance in previous round (“correct” or
“wrong” guess) affects participant’s decisions. Another
possible emerging strategy is the Win-Stays Lose-Shift
(W-S L-S) that relies on an stimulus response which, in
contrast with the MI strategy, considers the outcome of
the previous action. In this case, participants repeat their
last decision when this was correct, and change the deci-
sion when it was wrong guess. This Win-Stays Lose-Shift
6TABLE I. Behavioural biases with respect to the market dynamics. The first column indicates the decision of a single
round “up” or “down”, or with respect to the previous one, “repeat” or “change”, for either the participants in our experiment
(second and third columns) and market data (fourth and fifth). The last to columns compute the difference between humans
and market either directly (sixth column) or in terms of Standard Deviation units as defined in the Supplementary Information
(seventh column).
Subjects Market Difference
Decisions Probability Ocurrences Probability of probablities in SD units
“up” 11137 0.606± 0.004 10382 0.533± 0.004 +0.073 +8.37
“down” 7299 0.394± 0.004 8143 0.467± 0.004 −0.073 −8.37
“repeat” 9889 0.561± 0.004 9445 0.536± 0.004 +0.025 +4.77
“change” 7732 0.439± 0.004 8176 0.464± 0.004 −0.025 −4.77
pattern has also been found in several contexts [50–52].
To quantify the importance of these two emerging
strategies in our experiment, we have computed the
mutual information [53] (that is: mutual dependence)
to measure the influence of the two different emerging
strategies in the participant’s actions. Mutual informa-
tion is defined as
I(X,Y ) =
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
=
∑
x,y
p(y|x)p(x) log p(y|x)
p(y)
,
(1)
where X and Y are the two random variables. It is de-
fined positive and takes values between 0 and 1, meaning
that both random variables are completely independent
or that they are perfectly correlated respectively. Mutual
information values are given in bits units since we have
used the logarithm with base two.
Firstly, in relation to the MI strategy, we compute
the mutual information between participant decision se-
ries (“up” and “down”) and previous market movements
(“up” or “down”): 0.045 ± 0.010 bits. And, secondly in
relation to the W-S L-S strategy, we compute the mutual
information between participant decision series (“up” or
“down”) and outcome of previous action (“correct” and
“wrong”): 0.050 ± 0.010 bits. In both cases, mutual in-
formation might seem quite small but it is significantly
higher than not only the market self-information case
(that is: the mutual information between the series of
direction of market changes shifted one day, 0.003±0.010
bits) but also the participant’s self-reflected actions case
(that is: the mutual information between the guesses se-
ries shifted one step, 0.005± 0.010 bits). Supplementary
Information has a specific section discussing all these re-
sults.
Indeed, we can go one step further by looking at the
conditional probabilities related to these two emerging
strategies. Figure 3 confirms the presence of the MI
strategy in our experiment and shows a striking differ-
ence between the empirical probability to choose “up”
after market having raised (p(↑ | ↑M) = 0.714 ± 0.005),
and the probability to do so but after market having
fallen (p(↑ | ↓M) = 0.469± 0.006). These two conditional
probabilities differ from the unconditional probability to
choose “up” (p(↑) = 0.606 ± 0.004) by 18.59 Standard
Deviation (SD) units above and 19.04 SD units below re-
spectively. The imitation is also relevant in the “down”
case. The probability of choosing “down” conditioned to
the market went “down” is p(↓ | ↓M) = 0.531 ± 0.006
being 20.37 SD units above the unconditional probabil-
ity p(↓) = 0.394 ± 0.004 from Table I, while p(↓ | ↑M
) = 0.286 ± 0.005 is 16.86 SD units below this value.
It is worth mentioning that the MI strategy describes a
behavioural bias towards upwards market direction that
might be linked to optimistic behaviour and overconfi-
dent position with respect positive trends in financial
markets [44] and even linked to financial bubbles [20, 54].
Figure 4 focuses on the W-S L-S strategy. In this case,
the probability to repeat a successful decision is 0.682,
that is 0.121 (19.92 SD units) higher than the probability
to repeat any decision, 0.561 as shown in the Table I. In
the same way, the probability to change a wrong decision
is 0.579, what is 0.140 (21.18 SD units) greater than the
probability to change any decision. Again we observe a
behavioural bias being more probable to persist after a
successful guess than to change decision after a wrong
guess. In this case, shifting the stretegy when guess is
“wrong” can be also related to negative skewness risk
[55], to the asymmetric risk (and the increment of market
volatility) due to unexpected price drops [56, 57].
One obvious question we can formulate is which is the
dominant emerging strategy in our experiment. One way
to measure the possible differences is by computing the
conditional mutual information (see Supplementary In-
formation for the whole analysis). Mutual information
between participant’s actions and previous market move-
ments conditioned to the previous outcome is 0.05±0.04
bits, while mutual information between participant’s ac-
tions and previous outcome conditioned to the previous
action market movements 0.07 ± 0.04 bits. These two
conditional information values are telling us that there is
non-redundant information. However, market direction
(and its subsequent MI strategy) seem to be more rele-
7vant since the mutual information conditioned to know
the market is higher.
Another possible approach to evaluate the dominant
emerging strategy is the one summarized in Figure 5. In
this figure we unfold all possible scenarios with a two-
step chain where the MI and W-S L-S strategies appear
and can be therefore compared. Thus, for instance, the
“up-success-up” probability is 0.729 while the probability
related to the MI strategy (only conditioned to what mar-
ket did before, without considering the performance) is
0.714, thus being much closer than the probability (0.682)
related to the W-S L-S strategy. Figure 5 shows how MI
is systematically closer to the two-step conditional prob-
abilities than the W-S L-S strategy. Therefore, the anal-
ysis suggests that the impact of MI strategy is greater
than that of the W-S L-S strategy and reinforces the
conditional mutual information results.
Emerging strategies versus information, time and
expert advice
We test if the conditional probabilities of the MI strat-
egy are also influenced by other variables like the time
used to take a decision, the amount of information exam-
ined or if the participant consulted the expert’s advice.
As it can be observed in bottom-left of Figure 3, gen-
erally the more time spent to take a decision the lower
the values of p(↑ | ↑M) and p(↓ | ↓M) with respect to the
reference value. Such probabilities are however above the
reference value when the decision is taken without con-
sulting any information and fall below the reference when
one extra panel is consulted (bottom-right Figure 3). The
expert’s advice also affects the values of p(↑ | ↑M) and
p(↓ | ↓M) by reducing in 0.077 and 0.017 respectively. W-
S L-S strategy is also susceptible to either time, amount
of information and expert advice influences in a similar
manner. Regarding the expert’s advice, the probability
to repeat after a success having consulted the expert is
reduced by 0.072 (−6.80 SD units) with respect to the
reference level, while the case to chose “down” when mar-
ket has fallen and having consulted the expert is 0.037
(−2.92 SD units) below the reference.
We next perform a coarse-grained approach where we
tag all the participant’s decisions using the two possible
labels: if they “Follow (emerging) Strategy” or if they
do “Not Follow (emerging) Strategy”. Thus, “Follow an
Strategy” in the MI case would mean to choose “up” af-
ter market goes up, and choosing “down” after market
goes down (see Figure 3). The values of the other two
branches in the tree diagram of Figure 3 would be aggre-
gated to conform the “Not Follow Strategy” probability.
We can proceed in the same way with W-S L-S, where
“repeat” after success or “change” after a wrong guess
would mean “Follow Strategy”. Interestingly, we show
in the Supplementary Information that for our binomial
scheme the aggregation process for the conditional proba-
bilities of the MI and W-S L-S strategies lead to the same
events for “Follow Strategy” and “Not Follow Strategy”.
The probability to follow any of the two emerging
strategies is 0.634± 0.004, that is 0.134 (25.70 SD units)
over the 0.5 reference if decisions were random. The
probability to “Follow Strategy” is also affected by time,
information and expert’s advice as shown in Figure 6, but
now the influence seems more evident than in the cases
where the two strategies are treated separately. It ap-
pears very clear that the tendency to follow any strategy
decays with the time spent to take a decision. Moreover,
participants without extra information are going to fol-
low much more the emerging strategies in clear contrast
to the case with just one extra piece of information (cen-
ter Figure 6). Surprisingly, more information does not
motivate participants to abandon these intuitive strate-
gies since, after consulting more than 1 panel, the proba-
bility to follow the strategy increases and stays quite sta-
ble close to the same value as to the case of having not
consulted extra-information. One possible explanation
for this is that two or more different pieces of informa-
tion are also two different kind of stimulus and they may
induce to two different responses (perhaps contradictory
responses). Due to an information overload [28], actions
would be mostly again governed by emerging strategies.
The influence of the expert’s advice then becomes very
evident in the right panel of Figure 6. We observe that
the probability to follow any strategy after the expert
is consulted is 0.582, which is 0.053 below the reference
value (6.47 SD units).
Indeed, the simplicity of the coarse-grain analysis make
possible to perform a cohort analysis. Table SI.3 of the
Supplementary Information shows that all cohort groups
tend to follow these intuitive strategies with a probability
between 0.6 and 0.7, thus providing more universality in
this finding. However, there are two exceptions. Firstly,
women are more likely to follow these intuitive strategies
than men, which is coherent with the fact that they use
less time to take decisions and consult less information
(including the expert advice) than men. And secondly,
children from 0 to 15 years old (corresponding to Pri-
mary School) tend to follow the intuitive strategies with
a higher intensity than the rest of the groups. Likewise
the women group, this is also consistent with the fact
that kids take faster and less informed decisions.
DISCUSSION
Facing environments with high levels of uncertainty is a
very complicated task for human beings [20]. We have se-
rious difficulties when dealing with randomness, we tend
to see patterns when there no exist at all [46]. Moreover,
decision-making process involves multiple factors, which
may be far from a rational behavior, like stress and panic.
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FIG. 3. Decision conditioned to market: the Market Imitation emerging strategy. Empirical conditional probabilities
of guessing whether market will go up or down are positively correlated with market behavior in the previous round. Participants
tend to mimic market movement and this behavior is specially important when market went up (p(↑ | ↑M) = 0.714 ± 0.005).
The effect is however sensitively diminished when subject consults expert’s advice (0.637). (down left) The time spent to take
a decision plays a significant role when a participant guesses that market will go “up” (green) in contrast with case when a
participant guesses that market will go “down” (red). (down right) Checking an additional type of information also tends to
diminish conditional probabilities but when a participant consults more information, the participant mimics market movement
again. Horizontal lines in bottom plots provide aggregated results and shadows their error bars. Error bars represent the
standard deviation of a binomial distribution.
Therefore, models that only depart from rationality and
self-interest could also incorporate concepts linked to how
humans cope with uncertain environments [8].
In this experiment, carried out inside the Pop-Up Ex-
periments framework [36], we put a group of volunteers
non-expert in finance under such uncertain environment.
We asked participants to predict the day-by-day evolu-
tion of a series of real historic prices of a certain index,
allowing them to consult some information while register-
ing every action [20, 29]. The 18,436 decisions taken by
283 subjects are very far from being random. Looking at
the data we most importantly find two behavioral biases
through consistent actions: a preference to guess that the
market will move in the same direction as the previous
day and a tendency to repeat the previous decisions when
they are correct. We identify Market Imitation and Win-
Stay Lose-Shift strategies as the mechanisms responsible
of such biases. These strategies also appear in other con-
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FIG. 4. Decision conditioned to performance: the Win-Stay Lose-Shift emerging strategy. Empirical conditional
probabilities of repeating previous guess are positively correlated with success and failure of the previous guess. The highest
probability corresponds to repeating the previous guess when this was correct (0.682). The expert’s advice partially neutralizes
the effect (0.610). (down left) The conditional probability decreases when participants spend more time to take the decision in
both cases: being “correct” (green) and being “wrong” (red) in the previous round. (down right) The conditional probability
initially diminishes but when a participant consults more information it oscillates around the mean in both cases: being
“correct” (green) and being “wrong” (red) in the previous round. Horizontal lines in bottom plots provide aggregated results
and shadows their error bars. Error bars represent the standard deviation of a binomial distribution.
texts [49, 51]. The coarse-grain approach allows us to
identify these strategies as something intuitive because
of three reasons: (1) the less time used to make a de-
cision the more likely to follow any of this strategies,
(2) the probability to follow any strategy is significantly
higher when only a price chart has been consulted and (3)
consulting the expert (as a clear exogenous signal) signif-
icantly mitigates the likelihood to follow this strategies.
The wide range of demographics in our sample allows
also to identify that women and children are more intu-
itive and likely to follow these strategies since in average
they take decisions faster and consulting less information
than the rest. Moreover, we repeated the same experi-
ment in a conference with different demographics and
we confirmed the robustness of our findings. We have
also looked at the influence of the previous two steps
and we find that, although mutual information values
are not relevant anymore, one can still find some traces
of behavioural biases. See Supplementary Information
for further details on these two last results.
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FIG. 5. Two-step Markov chain to observe that Market Imitation is the dominant emerging strategy. The tree
of possibilities for the probability to choose “up” or “down” depending on two conditions: the direction of the market in the
previous round and the performance of the user (success or not) in the previous round. The tree includes the conditional
probabilities of the Market Imitation and Win-Stay Loss-Shift emerging strategies to observe which of them is the dominant
strategy. We observe that Market Imitation conditional probabilities are closer to the aggregated conditional probabilities
corresponding to the event to “Follow and Strategy” than those from the Win-Stay Loss-Shift emerging strategy.
The direct implications of this study point to market
policy, traders and market modelling. The pretended
advantages of the vertiginous pace of markets and par-
ticularly the high-frequency trading are nowadays ques-
tioned [58]. In the scale of non-expert individuals, who
sometimes might decide to manage their own portfolio,
we have seen that fast and uniformed decisions tend to
intuitive and pre-established behaviors in contrast with
rational and deliberated decisions. However, it should be
investigated whether such intuitive behaviours take place
also in real markets but there are already studies finding
some evidences in traders and fund managers behaviors
[20, 28]. Our findings anyway supports the idea of de-
celerating the vertiginous velocity of markets in order to
gain rationality and information filtering. From another
perspective, our results are of interest for better han-
dling clients expectations of trading companies, avoiding
behavioural anomalies in financial analysts decisions and
improving the trading digital interfaces where informa-
tion is set down. It should finally carefully be analyzed
the information provided and how it is hierarchized to im-
prove market in many senses [28]. In a more general way,
our results could also help to develop new agent based
modelling or stochastic price dynamics to better under-
stand financial bubbles or the effects of asymmetric risk
perception to price drops [20, 30, 56, 57, 59]. The study of
the different behavioural biases arising form the emerging
strategies can provide some explanation of financial bub-
bles (Market Imitation, specially for the upwards trends)
and how price drops increase market volatility (Win-
Stay Loss-Shift, when changing previous decision after
a “wrong” and thus increment market uncertainty). In-
dividuals, as agents who make decisions living in a society
impregnated of contingencies impossible to evaluate and
constantly updated where we have to take uninformed
decisions, must be aware of these intuitive strategies as
a fallacies to avoid or lighthouses that help us to sail in
the middle of an ocean of uncertainty.
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FIG. 6. Aggregated strategies: time, information and expert advice dependences. (Left) The probability to follow
any of the described strategies depending on the time spent to make the decision. The range between 0 to 30 seconds has been
divided in bins of 5 seconds. (Center) The probability to follow any of the described strategies depending on the number of
different information panels consulted. (Right) The bar on the left accounts for the probability to follow any of the described
strategies, whereas the bar on the right indicates the same, but conditioned to having clicked on the expert’s advice panel. Solid
black line denotes the total probability while the limit of the shaded area and the error bars denote the standard deviation.
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